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ABSTRACT 
A process based management strategy is crucial to enable productivity and cost effectiveness 
enhancement in high value manufacturing. This paper introduces a Manufacturing Failure Mode 
Avoidance (MFMA) framework based on four high level steps, underpinned by a series of structured 
tools to support a structured function-based decomposition of complex manufacturing processes and a 
continuous flow of information towards the development of robust control plans. The approach draws 
from experience from the automotive industry where Failure Mode Avoidance (FMA) has been 
adopted as a strategy to achieve a step change in the effectiveness of business and engineering 
processes associated with the product creation process. The paper illustrates a pilot implementation of 
the MFMA framework on a case study for the manufacturing of an aerospace component, followed by 
a discussion of the broader applicability of the framework and directions for further work.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Increasing volume and production efficiency of high value / high complexity aerospace parts, 
components and assemblies requires a robust strategy for the design, development and control of 
manufacturing processes. This is a significant shift from the traditional emphasis placed upon part 
control and heavy reliance on complex and accurate machining centres and highly skilled and 
experienced operators. However, modern aircraft products have increasingly complex parts with 
tighter tolerances and greater requirements for the interchangability of components and assemblies. A 
change to process based management, focussed on the identification and control of critical process 
parameters, ensuring consistent delivery of parts first time through, is required to meet these demands 
whilst capably managing pressures to increase production rates in a cost conscious environment. 
In order to achieve the transition to a process driven manufacturing strategy, robustness and 
reliability need to be designed into processes through a deepened understanding of the relationships 
between desired process outputs and the characteristics which are used to create them (Glodek et al., 
2006). As robustness, defined by Clausing and Frey (2005), is “the ability of a system to function (i.e. 
to avoid failure) under the full range of conditions that may be experienced in the field”, reliable 
manufacturing processes can be achieved through identification and prevention of potential process 
failures. For the greatest impact, countermeasures to prevent failure need to be designed and deployed 
early in the design of manufacturing process when the freedom for change is highest. However, as it is 
difficult to avoid a potential failure that has not been identified (Kmenta, Finch and Ishii, 1999), a 
systematic method for the early identification of potential process failures and the deployment of 
robust countermeasures for their prevention is required.    
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been extensively applied across industries (Liu 
et al., 2011) as a proactive failure avoidance tool. FMEA aims to assess and improve the reliability of 
products and processes by discovering and correcting design or process deficiencies through the 
analysis of potential failure modes, effects, and mechanisms, followed by a recommendation of 
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corrective action (Yang, 2007). While Kmenta et al (1999) have recognized differences between many 
definitions of the term ‘failure mode’, for the purposes of this paper the functional basis suggested by 
AIAG (2008) has been adopted, i.e. a failure mode is defined as ‘any way or manner in which a 
product or process could fail to perform its desired function’. Applying FMEA encourages engineers 
to identify potential failure modes and understand their causes, which enables effective 
countermeasures to be deployed to prevent their occurrence, thereby avoiding the failure and its 
associated costs. Despite its widespread application, particularly in the aerospace, nuclear and 
automotive industries, there are many reported shortcomings with FMEA, such as: 
• FMEAs are highly labour intensive and there is a tendency to produce large, cumbersome 
documents (Bell et al., 1992); FMEAs are often seen to be ‘just more paperwork’ and as a 
result little benefit is expected (Johnson & Khan, 2003); 
• FMEAs often require an extensive time scale to complete the analysis, often incompatible 
with the set timing and resource allocated (Hawkins & Woollons, 1995); 
• FMEAs are not used effectively to support design decisions as failure causes are often not 
identified (McKinney, 1991), and the deployment of the tool is too late (Webb, 2002); 
• Without an organized approach to identifying failure modes, the analysis can become 
subjective limited by the level of experience and engagement of the engineering team 
conducting the analysis (Kmenta & Ishii, 1998). 
To address these issues, a systematic method is required to facilitate the effective and efficient 
identification of failure modes early in the design process, allowing preventative countermeasures to 
be implemented based on their causes.  
The Failure Mode Avoidance (FMA) framework discussed by Campean & Henshall (2012) offers 
a pragmatic approach to robust automotive system engineering design, facilitating early discovery of 
failure modes through the use of a structured sequence of proven engineering tools that are built 
around a central FMEA. The strength of the approach is underpinned by the introduction of a 
structured and systemic approach to function analysis which is focused on capturing interface 
functions which support the integration of the system. Failure modes analysis is strongly facilitated by 
the comprehensive function analysis, and it is focused on identification and prioritisation of function 
failure modes and their causes. This is followed by robust countermeasure development and design 
verification and validation. By developing a functional understanding of the system, FMA ensures 
that all potential mechanisms of failure are identified systematically through the design process, 
thereby facilitating actions for their avoidance. A clear flow of information between the integrated 
tools maintains scope throughout the analysis, which results in contained, concise and manageable 
documentation. This process has been proven through industry implementation (Campean et al 2013), 
and has a strong take up within the automotive industry. 
This paper presents the development of a Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance (MFMA) 
framework which adopts the principles and practices of FMA and applies them towards the design of 
robust and reliable manufacturing processes. After an overview of the proposed MFMA process, a 
case study of an aerospace manufacturing process is used to illustrate its deployment, followed by a 
discussion of the effectiveness of the approach  and reflection on opportunities for future work. 
2 MANUFACTURING FAILURE MODE AVOIDANCE PROCESS 
Similar to the FMA framework (Campean and Henshall, 2012, Campean et al, 2013), the proposed 
MFMA process is structured on four high level process steps and based on the ideology that in order 
to identify the manner in which a process can potentially fail, it is first necessary to understand how it 
is intended to “function” in order to deliver the critical part or assembly characteristics. Accordingly, 
the first step, Process Function Analysis (Figure 1), aims to map the process in a structured top-down 
approach, systematically identifying the manner in which critical characteristics of the part are 
achieved and the process factors that can affect each part characteristic as “noise” factors. On this 
basis, the following step, Process Failure Mode Identification, aims to identify and prioritise potential 
failure modes of the process as ways in which the process does not deliver the required functions, and 
to systematically identify causes for potential failure modes in relation to the “noise” factors identified 
in the previous MFMA process step.  The next process step revolves around the development and 
implementation of effective process improvements and control methods required to avoid the critical 
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failure modes. Finally, step four – Process Control and Validation, focuses on the deployment of 
dynamic process control plans (Ford Motor Company, 2004) to validate and monitor on going 
production, underpinned by the process function and function failure mode analysis, and 
incorporating any process improvement actions.  
Figure 1 summarises the MFMA process and the key tools utilised to support each process step. 
In order to illustrate the deployment of the proposed MFMA framework a case study has been 
considered and will be presented and discussed in the following section. 
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Figure 1: MFMA process framework: steps, objectives and supporting tools 
3 CASE STUDY 
This case study was based upon a machining process for the manufacture of a stainless steel aircraft 
bracket using a 5-axis CNC machining centre. This is an existing process that has been used to assess 
the feasibility of the MFMA framework. The deployment of the process was carried out with support 
from the engineering team responsible for the operation of the process. 
3.1 Process Functional Analysis 
Firstly, the inputs and the outputs of the process must be defined in terms of their specific 
characteristics and the metrics used measure to them. Once this is known, Process Mapping was 
iteratively applied to decompose the process at successive levels of abstraction into finite operations 
which provide a succinct description of how and when each of the part characteristic is created, as 
shown in the Process Map in Figure 2. Through this segregation of activities, the process is 
deconstructed into manageable components that facilitate the rest of the analysis by specifying each of 
the individual requirements of the process operations. 
Operation 30.2
Cut Pallet Out
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Clamp across Pallet Out
[N/m^2]
Operation 30.4
Cut Base Profile
Drill Holes 1 – 5
[mm]
Operation 30.1
Clamp Billet
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Apply Tapping Agent
[ml]
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Tap Hole 5
[Thread]
Operation 30.7
Cut Latch Profile
Cut Lug Profile
[mm]
Output
Part x
Material [Spec X]
Geometry [mm]
Hole Content 1 – 5 [mm]
Hole 5 Tapped [Thread]
Surface Finish [Spec X]
 
Figure 2: Process Map for the Case Study part 
A Process Flow Diagram (PFD) was constructed next, illustrated in Figure 3, adding technical 
detail which allows the part characteristics to be defined in greater depth. For this case critical 
coordinates of the components profile are detailed along with hole positions, diameters and tolerances. 
Furthermore, the process characteristics that create or affect the part characteristics are documented. 
These are defined as inputs to the process that can be actively controlled and monitored. “Noise” 
factors or sources of variation are also listed, which are, contrastingly, process inputs that cannot 
easily be controlled, i.e. they vary but are difficult to monitor or change at will. The format of this 
document, as the extract shown in Figure 3 depicts, means that these additions are documented against 
each process operation, which is beneficial as it forms the basis of establishing the relationships 
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between part and process characteristics. This document also provides the scope and level of 
resolution for the Process FMEA.   
 
Sources of Variation Process Function Graphical Flow Part Characteristics Process Characteristics
Tool sharpness
Tool length
Material hardness
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Pull back pressure
Contamination
Ambient temperature
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Cut Base Profile
(x,y)mm from Datum AB;
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5. (XX,XX)
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Drill Holes 1 - 5
(x,y)mm from Datum AB;
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1. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
2. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
3. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
4. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
5. (X,X) φ Xmm
Machining program [XXXX]
Tool type [XXXX]
Tool feed rate [m/s]
Spindle speed [RPM]
Operation	  30.4
 
Figure 3: An extract from a Process Flow Diagram 
The Characteristic Matrix takes the part and process characteristic information stored by the PFD, 
identifies the specific causal relationships between them and characterises their nature. By classifying 
the causal relationship between the part and the process sequence at specific operations, and the 
effects that they have at subsequent operations, this document provides an important record of the 
part-process linkages, facilitating total process understanding and supporting the development of the 
Process FMEA. For instance, as the extract in Figure 4 shows, the part characteristics created in 
operation 30.4 are used for clamping and location in operation 40.2. As a result, it is identified that the 
process characteristics used during operation 30.4 have a significant effect on the ability of operation 
40.2 to achieve its function.  
Process Characteristics 
Operation
30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 30.5 30.6 30.7 40.1 40.2
C
la
m
p 
P
re
ss
ue
M
ac
hi
ni
ng
 P
ro
gr
am
To
ol
 T
yp
e(
s)
To
ol
 fe
ed
ra
te
S
pi
nd
le
 S
pe
ed
C
la
m
p 
P
re
ss
ue
M
ac
hi
ni
ng
 P
ro
gr
am
To
ol
 T
yp
e(
s)
To
ol
 fe
ed
ra
te
S
pi
nd
le
 S
pe
ed
Ty
pe
 o
f t
ap
pi
ng
 g
el
Q
ua
nt
ity
 o
f t
ap
pi
ng
 g
el
Ta
p 
(T
oo
l) 
Ty
pe
Ta
pp
in
g 
D
ep
th
To
ol
 fe
ed
ra
te
S
pi
nd
le
 S
pe
ed
To
ol
 T
yp
e(
s)
To
ol
 fe
ed
ra
te
S
pi
nd
le
 S
pe
ed
D
eb
ur
rin
g 
to
ol
C
la
m
pi
ng
 P
re
ss
ur
e
Operation Function of Operation Part Characteristic Metric n/
m
^2
XX
XX
X
XX
XX
XX
X
XX
X
m
/s
R
P
M
n/
m
^2
XX
XX
X
XX
XX
XX
X
XX
X
m
/s
R
P
M
XX
XX
X
XX
X
m
l
XX
XX
X
XX
X
m
m
m
/s
R
PM
XX
XX
X
XX
X
m
/s
R
P
M
XX
XX
X
XX
n/
m
^2
30.4
Cut Base Profile,
Drill Holes 1 - 5
Cut Base Profile, (x,y)mm from Datum AB;
1. (XX,XX)
2. (XX,XX)
3. (XX,XX)
4. (XX,XX)
5. (XX,XX)
6. (XX,XX)
[mm]  (x,y) R R R R R X X X X CL
Drill Holes 1 - 5, (x,y)mm from Datum AB;
1. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
2. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
3. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
4. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
5. (XX,XX) φ Xmm
Position - [mm (x,y)]
Diameter - [mm] R R R R R X X X X
Key
X - Characteristic created on changed by process parameter
C - Characteristic used for clamping
L - Characteristic used for location
R - Process parameter at one operation has a strong effect on product characteristic 
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Figure 4: An extract from the Characteristics Matrix 
3.2 Process Failure Mode Identification  
Supported by the inward flow of information generated by the previous documents, the Process 
FMEA is effectively segmented into process steps and the part characteristics they create, which aids 
in the identification of failure modes based on any deviation from these requirements. Figure 5 shows 
how the knowledge generated in the Characteristic Matrix effectively populates the Process FMEA. 
Effects and causes of failure modes are derived from examining the process characteristics that are 
related to the creation of the part characteristics. Identifying causes is further supplemented by the 
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sources of variation recorded in the PFD (Figure 5). Once specific causes of failure are understood, 
then robust countermeasures can be effectively deployed to avoid failure. This occurs in the 
subsequent MFMA steps not included in this paper. Failure modes are ranked according to their 
severity and the likelihood of their occurrence by using a consistent scale, which allows process 
improvement actions to be prioritised.  
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Figure 5: An extract from the Process FMEA, demonstrating the cascade of information from the 
Characteristics Matrix 
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
The case study provided a good validation of the MFMA framework, showing that it is effective at 
identifying and mapping the critical part against process characteristics, as the basis for process failure 
modes analysis, which in turn identifies the scope for improvement action and control plans.  
The case study confirmed that the sequence of the tools is appropriate, beginning with a Process 
Map that deconstructs the process and its requirements into finite operations, which then provide the 
scope and structure for the following documents, allowing them to be contained and consistent. 
Furthermore, a strong flow of information demonstrates the integration between the tools, which 
facilitates effective and efficient completion. This is particularly true of the Process FMEA, as the 
information used for its population is collected in a logical and structured way, rather than through 
boundless and disordered brainstorming activities which can prove subjective.  
The case study also provided opportunities for potential improvements to be made to the MFMA 
framework. The causes of failure that are documented in the extract of the Process FMEA (Figure 5) 
demonstrate a mixed level of detail. For example, spindle vibration is identified as a potential cause of 
failure, but the pull back pressure on the machine tool is just one of the factors that could contribute to 
this. As a result, it is acknowledged that the spindle vibration is not only a cause of the failure, but a 
failure mode in itself at a machinery level, which will have its own variety of causes. Therefore, a 
machinery FMEA should be conducted in order to identify and prevent all the potential causes of 
spindle vibration, which will consequently allow the part’s geometry to be cut correctly. Without 
doing so, only the pull back pressure will be controlled, and the failure mode may still occur through 
an alternative cause. This identifies that there is a requirement for different levels of FMEAs with 
increasing resolution so that all potential failure causes can be identified at an appropriate level to 
facilitate the development of countermeasures for their prevention.  
Given that the case study was based on an existing process with no specific requirements for 
improvement, the opportunity to engage process improvement actions was limited. Instead, an audit 
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has been carried out on the current control plan for the part / processes against the Process FMEA. 
This validated the MFMA information flow, as any output from process improvement actions will be 
documented in the FMEA with a revised criticality analysis. 
In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that the FMA framework and its principles can be 
effectively applied in a manufacturing process design context, in order to provide robustness and 
reliability of processes on the basis of avoiding potential failure modes through the implementation of 
preventative controls. The main innovations in the approach consists of (i) introduction of a structured 
top down approach for process decomposition based on functional mapping; (ii) the use of an 
enhanced Process Flow Diagram and Characteristics Matrix, which identify process “noise” factors 
and map relationships within the process which include the effect of noise factors; (iii) a strong and 
coherent information flow between tools, facilitating the development of the Process FMEA, and 
effectively addressing the pitfalls of conventional Process FMEA deployment. The latter point has 
been confirmed through feedback from the engineering team that supported the case study. Future 
work is focused on deployment of the MFMA framework to more comprehensive case studies 
involving larger teams to fully validate the effectiveness of the approach. 
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